Abstract: Almost all practically relevant asymmetric cryptosystems like RSA or ECC are either based on the hardness of factoring or on the hardness of the discrete logarithm problem. However, both problems could be solved efficiently on a large enough quantum computer. While quantum computers powerful enough to break currently used parameter sets are not available yet, they are heavily researched and expected to reach maturity in 15 to 20 years.
or S/MIME. They protect communication between smart cards, smart phones, computers, servers, the cloud, or industrial control systems. However, in case one of the numerous attempts and approaches to build a powerful enough quantum computer turns out to be successful, Shor's algorithm [15] could be used to break RSA and ECC in polynomial time. While quantum computers are not ready, yet, significant resources are spent to boost their further development and they might become available within the next 15 to 20 years [10] . It is also worth mentioning that even though ECC or RSA are currently considered to provide adequate security, quantum computers could be used in the future to break the encryption of stored communication data. Some evidence that concerns about quantum attacks are realistic is also given by an announcement of the NSA Information Assurance Directorate (IAD) that it will initiate a transition to quantum resistant algorithms in the not too distant future [12] . In addition, the US National Institute of Standards and Technologies (NIST) is currently running a process to standardize new quantum resistant algorithms [11] . NIST is asking for submissions of postquantum key exchange, public-key encryption, and signature schemes to a competition-like standardization process. This will most-likely fuel further research and consolidate the field.
Post-quantum cryptography
A natural answer to the threat by quantum computers might be to use quantum mechanics to implement alternative cryptographic services. This has been explored in the past, mainly as quantum key distribution (QKD), where quantum effects are used to establish a secret key between two parties in a way that the key exchange is protected against passive adversaries. However, with QKD only key distribution can be achieved and current QKD technology has physical limitations like the requirement for a fiber optical cable or a line of sight. This rules it out as a true plug in alternative to RSA and ECC and is thus not further discussed.
In contrast, post-quantum cryptography (PQC) describes cryptosystems that are executed on classical computers and that have the same high-level behavior as currently available ciphers. Therefore, they can act as instant replacement for today's schemes. Currently, the main concern of researchers in PQC is asymmetric cryptography (i.e., replacing RSA and ECC). The reason is that the threat of Grover's algorithm [5] that quantumly attacks symmetric schemes can be mitigated by moving to already available and standardized 256-bit secure symmetric algorithms (e.g., AES-256 or SHA-512). To be protected against attacks by Shor's algorithm, PQC schemes rely on fundamental different hardness assumptions that are expected to be intractable by algorithms executed on quantum computers. The five common hardness assumptions or families of algorithms from the literature that are used to realize asymmetric post-quantum cryptography are (see [1] ): -Hash-based signatures: Signature schemes whose security can be reduced to the hardness of breaking a symmetric hash function. -Code-based cryptography: Mainly public-key encryption schemes related to computationally hard problems in coding theory. -Multivariate cryptography: Cryptosystems, mostly signature schemes, whose security is based on the hardness of solving systems of multivariate polynomial equations. -Lattice-based cryptography: A lattice is a regular structure of points. Schemes are based on the hardness of certain problems in such lattices. -Isogeny-based cryptography: Usage of the relation between two elliptic curves to design key exchange and digital signature schemes.
All five families allow the construction of various schemes that use vastly different parameter sets and that are based on conservative to experimental sub-hardness assumptions. A direct high-level comparison between families is thus hard and one has to look into the concrete scheme and instantiation. Due to this wide scope we focus in our thesis [14] on lattice-based cryptography [13] . Lattices have already been used to construct cryptosystems for several decades (e.g., NTRU and GGH) but they have received a lot more attention recently. Especially, the introduction of the user-friendly learning with errors (LWE) problem and ring-LWE (RLWE) problem allows the construction of schemes where the actual lattice structure is not really visible to the designer of a scheme. In general, to solve the LWE problem, one has to recover a secret vector s ∈ ℤ when given a sequence of approximate random linear equations on s. The RLWE problem works over polynomial rings and supports a security reduction to hard problems on ideal lattices while LWE enables reductions to random lattices. As a consequence, ideal lattices carry more structure as not all lattices are ideal lattices but also allow the design of schemes that achieve practical public-key, ciphertext, and signature lengths.
Research contributions
Security proofs, asymptotic security and efficiency analysis, and cryptanalysis are certainly the foundation required to understand a cryptosystem. However, schemes have to be implemented on concrete hardware and usually with strict requirements regarding performance, codesize, or implementation security to allow the evaluation for practical use-cases. In our thesis [14] we are thus focusing on practical efficiency and implementation aspects of ideal lattice-based cryptosystems. We try to answer the question how efficient lattice-based cryptography is on various devices, how the efficiency can be improved, and we compare our work with implementations of other quantum-resistant algorithms. The contribution of our work can be structured into four categories. The first category is general purpose building blocks applicable to a whole range of schemes. The second and third categories are novel implementations of public-key encryption and signature schemes on various platforms. The fourth is an implementation of the homomorphic encryption scheme YASHE that is not discussed in this article.
Building Blocks for lattice-based cryptography
The basic operations in ideal lattice-based cryptography are polynomial addition, subtraction, and multiplication 
This leads to
where ∘ denotes a coefficient wise multiplication. The advantage of the NTT is that an operation only requires roughly log 2 ( ) 2 modular multiplications and that the reduction modulo + 1 can be integrated into the NTT algorithm. Thus an -point NTT is sufficient to work with -coefficient polynomials.
In our thesis we investigate methods to accelerate polynomial arithmetic. One contribution is an open source processing engine that is implemented on reconfigurable hardware in VHDL and that supports NTT-based polynomial multiplication, storage of temporary polynomials, as well as polynomial addition and subtraction. As no standard parameters like specific moduli or certain numbers of polynomial coefficients have emerged yet, the engine can be configured by the user with a dimension and modulus of their choice during synthesis¹. The processing engine supports a limited set of commands to load, store, move, add, or subtract polynomials. Additionally, single NTT or inverse NTT operations can be triggered on polynomials. This way cases are supported in which one coefficient is fixed and already stored in NTT format (e.g., a secret or public key) and another one is changing. Instantiated on a small Spartan 6 the processing engine is able to execute about 10 096 multiplications per second for polynomials of dimension = 1024 and modulus = 65 537.
1 With some restrictions due to the NTT, e.g., has to be a power of two.
Implementation of an RLWE-based public-key encryption scheme
The Ring-LWE assumption and an RLWE-based passivelysecured public-key encryption scheme was proposed by Lyubashevsky, Peikert, and Regev [9] (denoted here as RLWE-Encrypt). The scheme offers good performance and reasonable ciphertext sizes and is the basis for the socalled NewHope key exchange scheme. NewHope uses some results from our thesis and was recently integrated into the Chrome browser by Google during an experiment [2] to test post-quantum cryptography. The experiment was concluded successfully and the results give evidence that ideal lattice-based cryptography is indeed a serious post-quantum candidate scheme. In our thesis we rely on our processing engine (see Section 3.1) as building block and propose a high performance implementation of RLWE-Encrypt on reconfigurable hardware. Due to the versatility of the processing engine and decomposition of polynomial multiplications using the NTT, one core can support key generation, encryption, and decryption and achieves exceptional performance and relatively low area consumption. At the time the original work was published, it provided a significant improvement of the time-area product compared to previous work. On the low-cost Spartan-6 family our core needs 58.52 μs for key generation, 52.04 μs to encrypt, and 26.03 μs to decrypt a block for a parameter set with dimension = 512 that is supposed to provide high security. Resource requirements turn out to be moderate and all parts of our implementation have constant runtime and inherently provide resistance against timing attacks.
We also implemented RLWE-Encrypt in software for constrained microcontrollers that are used in cost sensitive applications, e.g., the internet of things (IoT). To improve performance we optimized RLWE-Encrypt by accelerating the NTT compared to previous work by merging certain operations into the NTT itself and by removing an expensive bit-reversal step. The resulting software library has been implemented on the 8-bit AVR XMEGA architecture and uses assembly code for further performance optimization. In Table 1 we provide detailed performance and a comparison with other implementations on the same or similar hardware platform. The results show that our RLWE-Encrypt implementation outperforms RSA, ECC, and also the code-based PQC scheme QC-MDPC McEliece [8] .
Implementation of signature schemes
First efforts to tune ideal lattice-based signature schemes specifically for efficiency on constrained devices or hardware were made in 2012 by Güneysu, Lyubashevsky, and Pöppelmann [7] who proposed the GLP signature scheme. Another post-quantum candidate signature scheme is the bimodal lattice signature scheme (BLISS) [3] . BLISS allows more efficient, more secure, and also smaller signatures than GLP but requires the sampling of Gaussian noise. Thus, for BLISS random polynomials have to be sampled where coefficients are independent and where the coefficients follow a discrete Gaussian distribution. However, implementing a precise discrete Gaussian sampler on reconfigurable and embedded hardware for large standard deviations is usually rather costly or slow.
As a consequence, new techniques are required to speed up BLISS and other signature schemes that rely on precise Gaussians with large standard deviation. To improve efficiency of Gaussian sampling, we realize a sampler based on a cumulative distribution table (CDT) where binary search is improved using a shortcut table of intervals and use an optimal data structure that saves roughly half of the table space by exploiting the properties of the Kullback-Leibler divergence. Based on these techniques we provide implementations of the BLISS-I, BLISS-II, and BLISS-IV parameter sets on reconfigurable hardware that are tweaked for performance and offer 128 bits to 192 bits of security.
With our work, we provide the full picture of the performance that can be achieved by latest lattice-based signature schemes. Our BLISS-I implementation on a Xilinx Spartan-6 FPGA supports up to 8761 signatures per second using 7193 LUTs, 6420 flip-flops, 5 DSPs, and 5.5 block RAMs and outperforms the GLP implementation in [7] in terms of time and area. Additionally, we have implemented BLISS on a Cortex M4 microcontroller (see Table 1 ). Our implementation of BLISS on an AVR 8-bit microcontroller is several times faster than previous work and pre-quantum schemes.
Conclusion
Post-quantum and lattice-based cryptography is an exciting field of research that will most likely have a fundamental impact on future cryptography. With big enterprises like Google, IBM, and Microsoft as well as research institutions worldwide working on the development of quantum computers, more results and new ideas how to build powerful quantum machines are at least a possibility. Additionally, with government entities like the NSA and NIST pushing for post-quantum cryptography some fundamental changes in the cryptographic landscape are highly probable. With this thesis, a better understanding of the implementation properties of ideal lattice-based cryptography is given and it becomes clear that most schemes are indeed practical even on low-cost devices. However, still a lot of research is required and it is hard to predict the future and progress in quantum and post-quantum cryptography.
